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ANDREAS ENGERT, REID FELDMAN, PAMELA L.J. HUFF, DONNA W. MCKENZIESKENE, HANNO MERKT

Twilight in the Zone of Insolvency: Fiduciary
Duty and Creditors of Troubled Companies

COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES

REID FELDMAN:

Our panel will talk about comparative and international per-

spectives. I am going to start with a brief introduction, then I am going to call on
Andreas Engert to give an explanation of some key conceptual points that are important to understanding the problem we are dealing with in the European context.
Hanno Merkt is then going to give us a very rapid geographical tour of how these
problems are dealt with in several jurisdictions. I am then going to ask Donna
McKenzie-Skene to talk about a very interesting exercise that people in the United
Kingdom have gone through considering exactly what treatment should be given to
fiduciary duty-the duty of directors to people other than the shareholders-and
whether that problem should be left simply to the jurisprudence or treated by stating standards in a statute. Finally, I am going to ask Pamela Huff to give an assessment of this problem from Canada, a jurisdiction that shares traits with those of us
in Europe and, of course, the U.S., which we have been hearing about all day.
My introduction is set out in a slide presentation entitled "Twilight in the Zone
of Insolvency-View from the EU," and consists of a whirlwind tour of some key
points. The first concerns the EU legal context. On the screen is a map of the
European Union. It shows that we started off with six countries in 1957, which
seems like a long time ago. Several other countries joined, as shown on the screen.
We now have twenty-five countries in the EU.'
Keep in mind that along with the EU there is a separate institution called the
European Economic Area, or "EEA," to which the EU member states and three
other jurisdictions belong. In those three countries, by virtue of EEA membership,
many of the rules that are applicable in the EU also apply. In fact, the EEA countries are part of the free-trade zone with the EU. So there are at least twenty-five

1. At the time of the conference, there were twenty-five member states in the EU, but, as of January 21,
2007, there were twenty-seven member states.
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jurisdictions-and in some cases twenty-eight-that are concerned with many of
the things we are going to be talking about.2
EU law results from directives, regulations, and jurisprudence. The EU has a
court system, headed by the European Court of Justice, which is the final arbiter of
EU-law questions. Below that we have a court of first instance, which has jurisdiction over some EU law questions. However, each country still has national law,
national regulations, national courts, and national jurisprudence.
This general framework of course applies to the area of company law. The next
slide mentions common features of company law in EU countries, including some
of the structural elements and the capital-maintenance regime, which Andreas is
going to talk about. There are also lots of differences, as shown on the slide, which
are beyond the scope of our talk today: employee participation, shareholders rights,
board structure, disclosure, and minimum capital. I think that Andreas and Hanno
will tell us something about the comparison of the countries in that respect.
Since our subject is insolvency, our next slide mentions in passing the EU insolvency regulation. It does not deal with the issues we are talking about today. It
simply recognizes that there is going to be a jurisdiction in which the main insolvency proceedings will be held and that secondary proceedings will be held in other
jurisdictions. I was very interested to see that a few months ago the first decision by
a French court applying this regulation said that the French court is going to recognize the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy proceedings in the U.K. The court did not
do what judges often are tempted to do, and that is disregard what is happening
abroad and apply their own local rules. We will see what effect this regulation has;
however, I do not think it is directly relevant to the issues that we have on the table
today.
I have listed some of the bases on which managers of French companies can be
held liable. By "managers" I mean members of the board of directors and the chief
executive officers. I listed some obvious things, such as violations of law, as well as
publishing accounts not giving a true and fair view of the financial situation. I am
going to focus on a criminal statute that sanctions directors and other managers
when they use assets or credit of a company in bad faith in a manner that is contrary to the company's interest, whether to satisfy personal interests or to favor
another company in which the manager has direct or indirect interest. This statute
has broad application. As applied by the jurisprudence, bad faith is always presumed. Also, the reference to companies in which the managers have direct or
indirect interest includes companies in which they also serve as directors, whether
or not they have any equity interest. So basically what you have here is a situation
where, when a company enters into a transaction with another member of the
same group, the statute is likely to apply because there is likely to be overlap of the
2. As of January 1, 2007, there were twenty-seven jurisdiction, and in some cases thirty, concerned with
the issues discussed in this panel.
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boards. If the transaction is not in the interest of one of the participating subsidiaries of the group, the directors may be faced with criminal sanctions.
The last item on the list is particularly relevant for our discussion today. We have
had for many years a statute that permits what we call comblement de passif(contribution to liabilities). Very simply, when in a liquidation there is a shortfall-in
other words, assets do not suffice to pay the company's debts, which almost always
happens-the managers can be held liable for the shortfall if they have committed
a management error. The obvious question is, "What's an error?" Well, one could
say that when things do not go well that could be an error. The statute is very
broad. When we talk in France about potential director liability when a company is
in the zone of insolvency, this statute has always been there on the horizon.
In the application of this standard, the cases that have imposed liability are cases
where the directors have acted in an egregious fashion, very often involving selfdealing. So there is a big gap between the theoretical risks for the director and the
practical experience with the directors being sanctioned.
My last point relates to what in France is the perceived risk of managers' incurring sanctions. That is based first on past cases. Generally, they are not as attention-getting as cases in the U.K. or certainly in North America, particularly in the
U.S. I think, however, that France probably has had more attention-getting cases
than other continental European jurisdictions. I would like to hear what Hanno
says about that. But in the past, business executives being counseled would be likely
to say, "Well, Mr. Lawyer, I hear what you say about what is on the books, but none
of my friends ever got socked with any of these sanctions. And so what are the real
risks?"
One answer to that is the perceived trend as to new standards of liability. Shareholder activism is not at all as developed in France as in the U.S., but it is increasing. And perhaps there is what I call a judicial awakening-judges becoming more
aware of these economic phenomena from which they have been a little bit distant
for a long time. They are perhaps becoming more willing to sanction people for
this kind of behavior. I think the result is going to be more prudence on the part of
managers. At least the advice I give is that because "none of your friends ever got
socked with this stuff" in the past few decades does not mean the sanctions will not
be applied to you.
I will conclude by saying that I do not think there is any danger of France's
falling down the slippery slope of what some call litigious excess. People often ask
me, as an American lawyer and French lawyer, whether this American disease is
going to be imported into France. I think the answer is no, because of the culture
and the way the legal system works-we have no juries, for example. I do not think
we are going to have an American-type system where there is almost a certainty of
a lawsuit whenever things go badly, but we are going to see more prudence on the
part of managers.
So with that, I am going to turn it over to Andreas.
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ANDREAS ENGERT: Thank you, and Richard, thank you very much for having me
here. It was a great pleasure following your discussion today. I have learned a lot
about the way you in the United States think about these problems.
My sense is that American lawyers are somewhat uncomfortable with using fiduciary duties and maybe even corporation law generally for the purpose of protecting creditors. Therefore, I thought it might be interesting to look at jurisdictions
that consider creditor protection an important issue in corporation law and to
contrast this approach with the American one.
So, what is the European approach? When I say European approach, I mostly
refer to Germany, although there is now a certain degree of coherence and commonality among the European jurisdictions. Just a few words about fiduciary duties in this context-I think Hanno Merkt is going to go into more detail on
fiduciary duties, so I will be short on that topic. First of all, it is very clear for
European lawyers that fiduciary duties run to the corporation, so the corporation is
the beneficiary of fiduciary duties. That implies, naturally, that they serve the interests of shareholders as well as the interests of creditors.
Interestingly, under German law, there are specific fiduciary duties laid out in
the statute that apply in insolvency-not the vicinity of insolvency but only in
insolvency. Management is under a specific duty of care in managing the corporation's bankruptcy estate. In my view, that is an interesting parallel to the trust-fund
doctrine that plays such a great role in Production Resources Group, LLC v. NCT
Group, Inc.' So we have a specific duty of care in the zone of insolvency on behalf of
creditors.
In addition, we have a duty to file for bankruptcy. This may sound surprising to
you. It has to do with the kind of bankruptcy law we have. Germany is considered a
rather creditor-friendly jurisdiction, especially compared to the U.S., which has one
of the most debtor-friendly bankruptcy laws in the world. To say that German law
is creditor-friendly is to say that bankruptcy very often leads to liquidation. It is
therefore understandable that shareholders and directors are not very interested in
obtaining "creditor protection" from bankruptcy law. They want to avoid bankruptcy as long as they can. That is why we have an affirmative duty to file for
bankruptcy in insolvency. Obviously, German lawyers do not take issue with conceiving this duty as running to creditors.
An even more important aspect than fiduciary duties to creditors is that we still
have a relevant system of legal capital rules in place.' I spent some time this summer studying American law on this, and I realized that in the United States, legal
capital is quite meaningless. You can easily manipulate or get around it. That is
different in Europe, based on the EU second company law directive on legal capi-

3. 863 A.2d 772 (Del. Ch. 2004).
4. See Andreas Engert, Life Without Legal Capital: Lessons from American Law, in LEGAL CAPITAL IN
EUROPE 649-56 (Marcus Lutter ed., 2006).
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tal.5 The most relevant part of the European legal-capital regime is the notion of
capital maintenance. It aims at keeping some reasonable amount of net assets in the
corporation as an equity cushion for creditors. Economically, you can try to justify
this as a response to an underinvestment problem: Shareholders always tend to get
money out of the corporation because that is a way to increase creditor risk and
benefit from increased leverage. At the same time, pulling out equity may create an
increased risk incentive in conducting the business. European corporation law tries
to cope with this problem using legal capital. There is a lot of debate now on
whether the legal capital rules are justifiable on these grounds and whether we
should stick to this system. The EU Commission is considering abolishing legal
capital and moving in the direction of a U.S.-style system.6
In any event, the present legal capital rules still play an important role in creditor
protection. One reason is that European corporation law recognizes a concept of
"hidden distributions." What is a "hidden distribution?" As I understand it, in this
country you would treat only dividends, stock repurchases, and redemptions as
distributions in the corporation-law sense. Therefore, the American restrictions on
distributions work only on those types of transactions. They do not address other
transfers of value by means of a sale, a loan, or any other contract between the
corporation and its shareholders that is not at arm's length. Instead, you would
probably rely on fraudulent conveyance law. By contrast, these transactions raise
issues of capital maintenance in Europe. That is why you find a lot of cases on legal
capital in Germany but very few in the United States, as far as I can see. The
concept of hidden distributions, therefore, is one major reason legal capital matters
a lot in the European Union. From a functional perspective, you could think of it as
a fiduciary duty of directors towards creditors: They cannot transfer assets to shareholders and thereby put creditors at risk.
So, I was saying that creditor protection is generally much more of a concern in
European and German corporation law. Let us have a look at the various institutions. We have the fiduciary duties I was talking about. Then there is legal capital.
We also have, at least in Germany, restrictions on the repayment of shareholder
loans. In the U.S., you would probably term this "equitable subordination," which
of course is a bankruptcy-law concept.7 In Germany, it is again a matter of corporation law. We also have some veil piercing that is not as important as in the U.S. but
has become more relevant recently.

5. Second Council Directive 77/91/EEC of December 13, 1976, on coordination of safeguards in respect
of the formation of public limited liability companies and the maintenance and alteration of their capital,
available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal-market/company/official/indexen.htm.
6. HIGH LEVEL GROUP OF COMPANY LAW EXPERTS, A MODERN REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR COMPANY
LAW IN EUROPE 87-88 (2002), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal-market/company/docs/modern/consulten.pdf.
7.

Cf David A. Skeel, Jr. & Georg Krause-Vilma, Recharacterizationand the Nonhindrance of Creditors, 7

EUR. Bus. ORG. L. REV. 259 (2006).
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Now, compare this to what the U.S. has to offer in corporation law. There might
be fiduciary duties, which we have heard a lot about today, but which still do not
seem very stringent to me. There are very weak limits on distributions, and very
little case law on that. So this is also not really a corporation-law issue. Of course,
there is veil piercing in some extreme cases. In sum, I see very little creditor protection in American corporation law. It is dealt with mainly outside corporation law,
through fraudulent conveyance law-the functional equivalent to legal capital
under European law-and equitable subordination. Then, of course, in the U.S.
you strongly emphasize contractual self-protection by creditors, which we have
heard so much about again today.
I think one reason you are so confident about leaving creditors to protect themselves is that weak creditors in the U.S. seem to be better protected than they are in
Germany. For instance, employee pensions in Germany are just unsecured claims
against the corporation. As such, they amount to a sizeable percentage of the total
liabilities of German corporations. So there you have creditors that certainly do not
bargain for covenants or anything of the sort. They are not well protected at all,
whereas in the U.S., they are entitled to a separate pool of assets that is held in trust
for them to cover those claims. So you are certainly right to be a lot less concerned
about them than we are.
The differences in bankruptcy law also matter a lot. As I said, U.S. bankruptcy
law is much more reorganization-oriented. To me, bankruptcy in the U.S. seems
like simply a means of refinancing the corporation-an accident perhaps, but not a
lethal one. It is something that might happen to any corporation, something that a
firm goes through and then re-emerges. That rarely happens in Germany. Under
German law, bankruptcy still very often leads to liquidation, which explains why
we are very anxious to avoid bankruptcy.
To sum up, it is a bit of a stylized distinction, but I think it is fair to say that in
Europe we follow a "corporation law" approach and in the U.S. you have a "bankruptcy law" approach to protecting creditors.
One last word on the ultimate goal that any jurisdiction should pursue. I completely agree with what Alan Schwartz said about this. It seems very clear to me that
on the level of the law, overall efficiency and social welfare must be the goals. There
is a second question as to what role fiduciary duties and corporation law generally
ought to play within this framework. On that level, shareholder-wealth maximization may be the right answer. But it can only be a means to an end, a means to
enhancing overall efficiency. Whether we should reserve fiduciary duties to shareholders depends on the legal environment which is, as I have tried to show, quite
different in Germany and Europe from what it is here in the United States. Thank
you.
SIMONE SEPE: I feel that the European rules on corporate law are perfectly consistent with the European rate of growth, which is almost negative. Second, in Germany, there are two important economic issues. The first is that firms are owned
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS & TECHNOLOGY LAW
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by traditional investors, and traditional investors are banks, essentially. There's a
strong distribution of ownership toward banks in Germany. And Germany-like
Italy, to some extent Spain, and maybe also France-is a bank-based country.
Firms, when they want to get capital, go to banks. In the worst-case scenario, they
try to get money. In Germany you have strange corporate goals and a system that
provides another body, which in English is probably called a supervisory board,
which is on top of the board of directors. In a supervisory board there are directors
who are appointed by creditors-that is, by banks which have investment both as
creditors and as equity holders in firms. For these reasons, there is not an important legal issue about fiduciary duties toward creditors because the representatives
of creditors are on the boards. Can you confirm that or no?
ANDREAS ENGERT: I think it used to be quite right that banks had such a strong
influence, but that has changed a lot in recent years. I would not say it is true
anymore. Besides, the rules on capital maintenance do not really favor banks.
Banks do not need them at all. So I do not think that has much to do with creditorprotection law. In my view, that body of the law is really about protecting small
creditors, like the employees I have been talking about.
REID FELDMAN: Let me add that these generalizations, I think, are very useful,
but not necessarily for this issue. Generalizations dealing with what is the basis of
the capitalism system in certain countries-for example, bank shareholdings in
Germany-are cliches which may ring true to a large extent, but not for these
bankruptcy questions. The same questions as to possible director liability arise regardless of who the shareholders are.
SIMONE SEPE: Yes, I know, but there are data stating that more than seventy
percent of capital in continental European countries is provided by institutional
investors. It is not a generalization; it is a fact. There is 2002 research by Bacca and
other German scholars about the distribution of property and how firms mixed
capital in Europe.
REID FELDMAN: Right, and Andreas mentioned the EU Commission, which is an
executive branch of the EU. They are thinking about company-law reform precisely
to try to correct this problem of very slow growth. One of the things they see as a
problem is that the market for companies is not sufficiently active. They find that
the structure of corporate control is dysfunctional for exactly this reason. A lot of
the corporate reforms that come out of the EU Commission are intended to try to
correct this problem.
Just to finish up before I turn it over to you, Hanno, Andreas mentioned the
reorganization-based approach to bankruptcy in the U.S., as opposed to the liquidation approach. In France, the large majority of reorganization or bankruptcy
proceedings end up in liquidation. In France, we have a number of kinds of bankruptcy procedures, including a procedure called reorganization, which is not designed primarily to protect creditors. It is designed primarily to protect jobs, and is
not at all creditor-friendly. The new law, which I mentioned, has created a so-called
VOL. 1 NO. 2 2007
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Chapter 11-type procedure in France designed to be more like the U.S. law. It gives
companies a better chance, they think, to survive the process and come out and
therefore preserve jobs, lessening harm to growth rates and so forth. I would submit that there is a limited extent to which legislatures can, by tinkering with these
things, really affect economic phenomena. The approach, at least in France, is very
much, "We've got the slow-growth problem; let us try to solve it by changing the
bankruptcy law and so forth," whereas the structural factors are, I think, more
important.
We may be getting a little far afield. Maybe I can turn it over to you, Hanno, and
you can answer the question and pick up with your presentation.
HANNO MERKT: First, let me briefly address the point that Mr. Sepe made previously. When we talk about creditor interference with the internal affairs of the
corporation, we should look at the figures. In Germany, we have about 800,000
closed corporations, just about 8,000 stock corporations, and an even smaller number of stock corporations with a situation like the one you described. In that comparably small group of stock corporations, you might see large influential creditors,
usually banks, that are shareholders and creditors at once and, thus, find themselves in a position to interfere with corporate internal affairs. In the overwhelming
majority of corporations, however, there is no such interference.
Please note another important difference between European and U.S. law that
might tip the scale in our direction when it comes to doubtful creditor interference:
unlike U.S. law, Continental law, and in particular German law, does protect creditors by statutory capital-maintenance requirements. We do not make use of contractual substitutes like credit covenants that permit creditors to interfere with
corporate internal affairs in order to keep a corporation on track, with a whole
bunch of different rights and options to step in and, in fact, take management over.
Given that financial-covenant practice, I would estimate that bank creditors in the
U.S. have much more clout in corporate affairs than on the Continent.
I now turn to what I was invited for. Thanks for the floor, and thanks for the
invitation. Seen from a comparative perspective, many countries make use of fiduciary standards in order to protect corporate creditors. While these standards are
variously labelled (for example, as Treuepflichtverletzung,faute de gestion, wrongful
trading, etc.), they all impose a species of fiduciary duty on a corporation's managers on behalf of its creditors. More particularly, these duties divide into four categories according to whom they target: (i) the company's officers and directors; (ii)
its outside auditors; (iii) its controlling shareholders, particularly if they play an
active role in management; and (iv) the corporation's "favored" creditors, who have
been preferred by the company at the expense of other creditors. For the purpose
of comparison, all of these duties can be treated as belonging to corporate law, even
though in some jurisdictions they are formally attached to company laws. In other
jurisdictions, however, they are attached to insolvency law. In either case, they may
be reinforced by complementary elements of tort law or criminal law. Among comJOURNAL OF BUSINESS
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mon-law jurisdictions, e.g., the United Kingdom, standards mainly result from insolvency law, whereas American law combines corporate and insolvency laws. In
civil-law jurisdictions, creditor-protection standards tend to be provided mainly by
corporate law.
Jurisdictions impose a risk of personal liability on corporate directors in certain
circumstances, notably when a corporation is insolvent or close to it and the risk of
shareholder opportunism is large, although the breadth of these duties varies considerably. At the narrow end of the spectrum, the United Kingdom imposes a limited duty on directors not to engage in "wrongful trading" when a director knew or
should have known that the corporation was insolvent Similarly, U.S. case law
suggests that the fiduciary duties of loyalty run to the creditors, rather than the
shareholders, 9 and U.S. statutory law in many states explicitly permits boards to
consider the interests of nonshareholder constituencies when making major corporate decisions.' 0 Thus, even in the debtor-friendly U.S. jurisdictions, directors appear to owe a fiduciary duty to creditors when the corporation enters the "zone of
insolvency."" At the broad end of the spectrum, Dutch statutory law protects corporate employees by permitting unions to petition the courts to investigate the
conduct of the corporations' directors and managers.' 2 Japanese law holds directors
liable to third parties if they act in bad faith or are grossly negligent in managing
the corporation. 3 Similar duties to third parties theoretically arise under French
Law;' 4 however, French courts virtually never impose liability on directors on behalf of third parties as long as the company is solvent.' Finally, German Law for
public corporations mandates that management boards establish risk-management
systems for the identification and containment of developments that might
threaten the survival of the company.' 6 This intriguingly specific provision appears
designed to ensure that the risk preferences of all corporate constituencies, and

8.

Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 214 (Eng.).

9. See, e.g., W. World Funding, Inc. v. Buchanan, 52 B.R. 734, 762-63 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1985); JTS Corp v.
Mitchell, 305 B.R. 529, 536-40 (Bankr. N. D. Cal. 2003).
10. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 60.357 (2006); MAss. ANN. LAWS. Ch. 156B, § 65 (2006); O,-o REV. CODE.
ANN. § 1701.59 (2006); N.Y. Bus. CORP. § 717 (2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. 607.0830 (2006).
See Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland v. Pathe Commc'ns Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613
11.
(Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991); Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ'n Co., 621 A.2d 784, 787 (Del. Ch. 1992); Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Reliance Capital Group, Inc. (In re Buckhead America Corp.), 178 B.R. 956, 968 (D. Del.
1994); Jewel Recovery, L.P. v. Gordon, 196 B.R. 348, 355 (N.D. Tex. 1996); Weaver v. Kellogg, 216 B.R. 563,
583-84 (S.D. Tex. 1997); Askanase v. Fatjo, Civ. A. No. H-91-3140, 1993 WL 208440, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 22,
1993).
12.

See Art. 346 Dutch Civil Code.

13.

See Art. 266-3 Japanese Commercial Code (as amended in 2001).
See Art. L. 223-22 Code de Commerce (France).

14.
15.
368.
16.

See Maurice Cozian & Alain Viandier & Florence Deboissy, Droit des soci~t6s, 19th ed (Litec 2006), no.
See § 91 subsection 2 Aktiengesetz.
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especially employees, are reflected in corporate decision making at the level of the
management board.17
This does not mean, however, that creditors can generally take legal action
against directors before the corporation has filed for insolvency. The law of most
jurisdictions, apart from Germany"8 and Japan, 9 denies creditors standing to sue
the directors of a solvent corporation. Other jurisdictions limit standing to those
creditors that have been directly and individually harmed by directors. French law
makes an exception for bondholders by recognizing their shareholderlike standing
to sue the board before a corporation's insolvency. ° In any case, creditors would
have a much easier case against a solvent company itself than against one or more
of its directors.
Our major jurisdictions employ a broadly similar approach to framing the liability of board members. Directors, including de facto or shadow directors, may be
held personally liable for damages to creditors resulting from the board's gross
negligence or narrow pursuit of shareholder interests when the corporation is insolvent or nearly so. 2' The extent to which such personal liability provides significant protection for creditors varies with the circumstances. To give an example:
Directors of smaller firms are often principals, who are likely to lose their personal
and business assets simultaneously. Large firms, however, frequently purchase liability insurance for their board members, which protects directors while it can also
compensate injured creditors. In some jurisdictions, like Delaware22 or the United
Kingdom,23 director and officer liability insurance is explicitly authorized by
statute.
In addition, a variety of legal doctrines limit the personal liability of directors. In
the United States, most states permit corporations to eliminate directorial liability
for negligence or gross negligence by charter provision, and most of the corporations avail themselves of this opportunity by eliminating liability or providing for
indemnification. In fact, optional exclusion of personal manager liability in the
course of the last decades became a most influential element of the famous state
competition for corporate charters.24 As a result, the personal liability of directors is
limited to occasions in which they engage in self-dealing or otherwise act in bad

17.

The exact scope of this provision, however, remains unclear and disputed, see, e.g., UWE HOFFER,

AKTG-KoMMENTAR § 91 no. 5 (Beck 6th ed. 2004).

18.

See § 93 subsection 5 Aktiengesetz.

19.

See Art. 266-3 Japanese Commercial Code; J. MARC RAMSEIER & MINORu NAKAZATO, JAPANESE LAW:
AN ECONOMIC APPROACH 119 et seq. (University of Chicago Press 1999).

20.

See Art. L. 228-54 Code de Commerce (France).
21. See Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 214 (Eng.).
22. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a)(2001).
23. Companies Act, 1985, c. 6, § 310 (Eng.).
24. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)(2001). For an overview over the dissemination of such
provisions, see William J. Carney, The Production of Corporate Law, 71 S. CAL. L. REv. 715, 753 (1998).
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faith. To the extent it focuses on corporate fraud, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act2" seems
unlikely to affect such limitation, according to some commentators."
Other scholars argue that liability limitations do not prevent fiduciary duties
from influencing directors' behavior because they express socials norms; however,
with Enron, WorldCom, Parmalat, and other spectacular cases of gross directorial
misconduct worldwide having driven the risk of liability to yet-unknown levels,
director and officer liability insurance seems, at least in parts, unmanageable for
insurance companies and unaffordable for corporate employers. While those restrictions on personal director liability are primarily aimed at constraining abusive
shareholder litigation, they also affect the claims a corporation can make postinsolvency and thereby indirectly reduce creditor protection. Compare the situation
in Japan, where increased shareholder litigation also prompted a new rule to limit
director liability, but left creditors' rights unaffected.27
Other jurisdictions like France" and Germany,29 by contrast, hold directors who
act negligently on the brink of insolvency personally liable to creditors. As far as the
United Kingdom is concerned, this approach is a rather recent one, embodied in
the provision on directors' wrongful trading."0 In particular, French and German
directors become negligent per se by failing to observe capital-maintenance rules.
This liability is less far-reaching, however, than it might seem.
First, it is not easy to show that a board failed to act-for example, to call a
shareholder meeting or file for insolvency-at the precise point when the company
lost half, respectively all of its legal capital. This point depends, inter alia, on
whether the board uses going-concern or liquidation value." It is surprising to see
that on that issue the debate in the United States and in Germany follows pretty
much the same lines.32 Some U.S. and German courts have held that the proper
standard of valuation to be applied in determining solvency in a bankruptcy setting
is the value of the business as a going concern, not the liquidation value of its
assets." Liquidation value is appropriate; however, if at the time in question, the
business is so close to shutting its doors that a going-concern standard is unreasonable.34 One U.S. court has stated that the term "vicinity of insolvency" refers to the
"extent of the risk that creditors will not be paid, rather than balance sheet insol-

25. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 7201).
26. Larry E. Ribstein, Market v. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud:A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 135 (2002).
27. See Art. 266 (7) - (23) Japanese Commercial Code (as amended in 2001).
28. See Art. L. 223-22 (SARL) and 225-251 (SA) Code de Commerce; Art. L. 624-3 (action en comblement
du passif); L. 624-5 (action en extension de redressement ou de liquidation judicaire).
29. See § 43 GmbH-Gesetz; §§ 93, 116 Aktiengesetz.
30. Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 214 (Eng.).
31. See, e.g., KARSTEN SCHMIDT, GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 322 et seq. (Heymanns 4th ed. 2000).
32. For German cases, see MATHIAS HABERSACK, GROSSKOMMENTAR ZUM AKTIENGESETZ § 92 no. 36-45
(De Gruyter 4th ed. 1999).
33. Askanase v. Fatjo, Civ. A. No. H-91-3140, 1993 WL 208440, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 22, 1993).
34. Id.
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vency. '"3 According to Section 101 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, "insolvent" with respect to a corporation means a financial condition such that the sum
of such entity's debts is greater than all of such entity's property, at a fair valuation. 6 Finally, under the balance sheet test, a corporation is insolvent if its liabilities
exceed its assets and the firm is unable to pay debts as they became due in the
ordinary course of business. This test has been applied by U.S. courts that require
factoring in the value of the business as a going concern, as well as by the German
legislature, which introduced it in section 17, subsection 2, of the Insolvency Law.
In practice, alternative-valuation methodologies often give directors a one- to twoyear window to act without violating their duty to creditors. At the same time,
methods to detect near-insolvency based on firms' financial accounts are steadily
improved and refined. 7
Second, even if directors do violate their duty, establishing that they caused a
creditor's damage usually turns out to be very difficult. This is especially the case in
jurisdictions like Switzerland, where it is recognized that the duty of care and, in
particular, the applicable standard of care may vary among several directors of a
single corporation. 8 In Japan, for instance, creditors have standing to sue directors
even before a corporation becomes insolvent," but no director of a large Japanese
public corporation has ever been held liable under this provision. It is, however,
frequently litigated in the case of closely held corporations. In addition, the Japanese Supreme Court has developed a "director's duty to monitor" doctrine, under
which nonexecutive directors are held liable to creditors when they grossly failed to
monitor misbehaving managers. In Germany, empirical data show the opposite
direction: according to the cases litigated, the risk of being held liable is considerably higher for directors of large publicly traded corporations than for directors of
closely held companies.4" A possible explanation would be that close-corporation
cases are more likely to be settled out of court for lack of public interest.
Third, creditors cannot recover if the board's violation of duty did not increase
their consolidated damages, or if they knowingly assumed the risk of dealing with
an insolvent corporation.' In fact, under German law, the burden to prove a conditional link between the managerial misbehavior and the actual amount of damages suffered turns out to be the major obstacle for creditors in litigating such
35. Steinberg v. Kendig (In re Ben Franklin Retail Stores), 225 B.R. 646, 655 n.14 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1998),
affd in part,rev'd in part on other grounds, No. 97C6043, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16645 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 25, 1999).
36. 11 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
37. See JOCHEN DRUKARCZYK & TANJA BROCHNER, INSOLVENZRECHTSHANDBUCH 27 (Beck 2nd ed. 2001).
38. See PETER BOCKLI, SCHWEIZER AKTIENRECHT 1092 et seq. (Schulthess 3rd ed. 2004).
39. See Art. 266-3 Japanese Commercial Code (as amended in 2001).
40. See KLAUS J. HOPT, GROSSKOMMENTAR ZUM AKTIENGESETZ § 93 no. 16 (Berlin 4th ed. 1999).
41. See, e.g., Alon Chaver & Jesse M. Fried, Managers' FiduciaryDuty Upon the Firm's Insolvency: Accounting for Performance Creditors, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1813 (2002); Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking a Corporation's
Obligations to Creditors, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 647, 667- 68 (1996); Laura Lin, Shift of Fiduciary Duty Upon
Corporate Insolvency: Proper Scope of Directors Duties to Creditors, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1491 (1993); for
England, see § 214 Insolvency Act (Eng.).
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cases. It is presumed that many clear-cut cases of violation of managerial-trust
obligations are not taken to court because potential plaintiffs face serious problems
in ascertaining the damages attributable to the relevant violations.
Fourth, the quality of creditor protection by holding directors personally liable
depends considerably on whether and to what extent the shareholders may dispose
of any damage claims. While some jurisdictions, like Germany and France, are
rather creditor-friendly and do not give the shareholders a right to waive or settle
damages claims to the detriment of the corporation's creditors, other jurisdictions,
like the Netherlands42 and Italy43 give the shareholder assembly a limited right to
dispose of such claims.
Hence, it is mainly the United Kingdom that imposes a somewhat stricter duty
on directors to attend to creditor interests in the vicinity of corporate insolvency,
compared to other jurisdictions, including the United States. At the same time, the
United Kingdom has recently increased enforcement of the Company Directors
Disqualification Act of 1986," 4 which allows courts to disqualify directors of insolvent companies who have proved themselves to be unfit for future management
activities, whether these parties are actual directors, de facto directors, or shadow
directors.4" This standard apparently includes disqualification for failing to attend
to accounting matters or engaging in reckless conduct.4 6 When considering the issue of unfitness, courts are required to take into account any misfeasance or breach
of any fiduciary or other duty. The number of unfit directors disqualified increased
steadily over the last decade, reaching almost 1,600 in 2001." Courts have typically
disqualified directors for setting up undercapitalized companies, attempting to
trade on the back of their creditors, or showing incompetence or negligence to a
very marked degree. Moreover, the available evidence indicates a relatively small
number of wrongful trading petitions, especially compared to disqualification proceedings. Thus, some commentators suggest that disqualification may be a more
effective remedy than liability, although the disqualification action has yet to
achieve any real traction in continental Europe. France, for instance, has similar
disqualification provisions,4" but they are not enforced. Even in the United Kingdom, scholars articulated doubts about the effect of disqualification provisions,49
but this has not prevented the remedy from being considered to be a candidate for
European harmonization.
42. See Tim Drygala, Directors Liability in the Member States of the European Union, in: Marcus Lutter
(ed.), Legal Capital in Europe (De Gruyter 2006), 232, 243.
43. See Art. 2393 VI Codice Civile (Italy).
44. Company Directors Disqualification Act, 1986, c. 46 (Eng.).
45. Id. at §§ 6-9.
46. See id.
47. See The Insolvency Service Executive Agency, Company Director Disqualification-A Follow Up Report (1999); Insolvency Services, Annual Report and Account 2000-2001, 17 (2001).
48. See L. 625-8 Code de commerce (France).
49. VANESSA FINCH, CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW: PERSPECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES 536 (Cambridge Press
2002).
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DONNA MCKENZIE-SKENE: I will speak to this audience on the subject of fiduciary duty to creditors, if such a duty does in fact exist. It seems to be well established
in Britain, built on commonwealth authority.
I started out in my paper by identifying uncertainties, many of which have been
mentioned in the context of the debate of the provisions. So as to the question of
whether it is a direct or an indirect duty in Britain, mainly the authorities regard it
as an indirect duty that is owed to the corporation. Which creditors do or should
benefit from the duty? Again, there is not been a lot of guidance on that. Some
recent authority has given more guidance, but it is still very incomplete.
There have been issues as to the extent to which the creditor interest should be
considered when insolvency arises. Some case law suggests an exclusive consideration that equates with the subordination that we talked about earlier. Some suggest
that you can continue to consider those interests along with other interests such as
shareholders, employees, and so on. The issue of whether the director's duty is to
be assessed subjectively or objectively according to the case law is simply unclear.
Then there is the issue of when the duty arises. In my paper, I developed those
points and made some evaluations as to the extent of the duty as well as drew some
conclusions. So there are problems with defining the point at which the duty arises,
defining the concept of insolvency, perhaps the difficulties of factually identifying
when it is reached and whether the knowledge of insolvency on the part of the
directors should be tested subjectively or objectively. In all of these situations, the
duty according to case law is still unclear.
It is against that background that we had the Company Law Review, which considered, among other things, the duty in some detail. The Company Law Review
was set up in 1998 to consider reform of core company law, and it included consideration of directors' duties where the company is insolvent. Directors' duties as a
whole were a major part of what the Company Law Review considered. The Law
Commission and the Scottish Law Commission had jointly considered reform of
certain aspects of directors' duties, particularly conflict of interests, and proposed a
statutory statement of directors' duties, but the Company Law Review was to take a
much greater look at the idea of directors' duties and to whom these duties should
run.
Initially, the Company Law Review acknowledged an overriding duty to creditors
in certain circumstances, including the director's fiduciary duty in the zone of insolvency as well as the duties (like wrongful trading) that arose on insolvency itself,
but initially it did not really consider the matter any further. It did not make any
recommendations as to what would happen to that fiduciary duty, and neither did
the Law Commissions when they reported and recommended a partial codification
of directors' duties. They had recognized, as had the Company Law Review, the
existence of the duty, but they did not propose to do anything about it in their
Report.
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As the Company Law Review progressed, however, we saw various changes in
attitude. In the next consultation paper that was issued, they did consider whether
a specific duty equivalent to the existing common-law fiduciary duty to creditors
should be included in the statutory statement of directors' duties. They specifically
rejected it for reasons that seemed to have as much to do with rejection of the
existence of such a duty as the idea of trying to embody it in the statute. I think
that is important, and I will come back to it.
In the next paper, however, they said that they were going to retain the duty,
even though they were rejecting putting it in a statutory format. Nonetheless, they
also suggested that the statutory statement should contain a reference to the existence of this duty, otherwise that statement would not be a complete picture of all
of the directors' duties.
The fifth and final report came out in 2001, and we had not one, but two provisions in the draft statement of duties concerned with the directors' duties to creditors. Now, the first of those basically repeated the insolvency law position on
wrongful trading as Hanno just mentioned. The other provision was based on a
version of the common-law duty to creditors. The critical thing, however, is that
the Company Law Review members were split about the inclusion of that second
duty based on the common-law duty to creditors, and perhaps given all of the
things we heard today, that is not very surprising. Those who wanted it, however,
included in the draft statement of duties a draft of such a provision.
Of course, one might take issue with the terms of that draft, which are included
in my paper, but the one thing the draft did do, I suppose, was to give us certainty
on a lot of the issues, which had up until that point been uncertain. It confirmed
that the duty was owed to the company. It confirmed the point at which it arosenamely, where it was more likely than not that the company would at some point
become insolvent. And it defined insolvency. It said that the test for assessing when
the duty arises is objective, but the test for assessing compliance was subjective to
give some protection to directors-equivalent, if you like, with the business judgment rule. It said the creditor interests should continue to be considered alongside
other interests, but it did not give any further guidance on the creditor's duties. As I
said, one may take issue with that, but at least it solved some of the problems of
uncertainty.
Nonetheless, in its paper that followed the Company Law Review Report in 2002,
the government rejected both provisions. I think it was right to reject the provision
based on the wrongful-trading provision that already existed on insolvency. There
was no point in repeating it in that context.
I am not so sure that it was right to reject the other provision. The government
has made it clear that it is going to retain the common law and provide in the
statutory statement of duties a warning that this common-law duty applies. If we
are going to be stuck with the duty, then in my view, you would be better to have
some statutory formulation of that duty that is slightly more certain than we have
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at the moment, to allow directors and others to be more fully and confidently
advised as to what exactly their duties ought to be. Now, I know that the way the
common law has developed, we are given flexibility, but that flexibility, of course,
comes at a cost. Arguably, we are being advised in the statutory statement that we
have a duty, but we do not know quite what it does and we have to wait for a court
to try to clarify that for us.
So do we need it at all? I will say that we have to try to put it in the context of the
other provisions-the wrongful-trading provision, which applies where insolvency
is inevitable, and a fraudulent-trading provision, a misfeasance provision, and provisions for reducing prior transactions, all of which apply only on insolvency. This
duty arises at an earlier stage and so could provide a remedy where the other remedies do not apply.
We also have disqualification. It is arguable that disqualification, if one looks at
the cases, has actually developed this duty to a much greater extent than the cases
that are based directly on it have done. They have picked up on the idea of trading
with knowledge of insolvency, which is the formula the courts normally use in this
context, where there is no reasonable prospect that creditors will get paid. That is
important because it is an objective test. They have said that doing that, i.e., trading
with knowledge of insolvency, can amount to unfitness, which will result in disqualification. That clearly does not result in any money for the creditors, which is
why disqualification is different from the other remedies that we are talking about,
but it does, to a certain extent, reflect, if you like, what creditors can expect to
receive.
Directors are looking not only at the specter of personal liability, but at the
specter of disqualification, which could prevent them from earning a living without
personal liability. That might be as big a deterrent against ignoring creditors' interests in the zone of insolvency as personal liability for breach of the fiduciary duty.
PAMELA HUFF: As the last speaker of the panel and the last speaker of the day, I
have the pleasure of bringing the discussion back to North America, not back to the
U.S., but back to Canada.
Russell Silberglied and I coauthored a paper comparing the remarkable similarities of statements made by Vice Chancellor Strine in Production Resources' to the
Supreme Court of Canada in the People v. Wise5 case. The decisions were released
within about one month of each other. I have learned two new acronyms today, the
DDC doctrine and the IFDC, both of which I am going to take back to Canada to
infiltrate in our legal journals.
Now it is my job to give you a brief overview of the DDC doctrine in the common-law jurisdiction of Canada. I can speak with some clarity on this, since the
Supreme Court of Canada has just considered it. Russell said at the outset that
50.
51.

Prod. Res. Group, LLC. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A. 2d 772 (2004).
Peoples Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Wise, [2004] S.C.R. 461, 484-85.
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some commentators think that Vice Chancellor Strine blew it by not doing away
with fiduciary duties of directors to the creditors. Those commentators would like
the Supreme Court of Canada because it did do away with the fiduciary duty to
creditors on the theory that there was no gap to fill, there was no need for this
additional remedy. The Supreme Court of Canada decision followed a series of
lower-court decisions in Canada that were flirting with the concept of director
duties' shifting to creditors on the eve of insolvency.
There was no clear or reliable statement. There was some obiter on it, but now
we do have the final statement of the Supreme Court of Canada on the issues. In
order to understand what the Supreme Court of Canada was doing, you need to
understand, at least briefly, the legal framework in Canada, which has some remarkable differences to its counterpart in the United States.
In the mid-1970s, we embarked on a complete rewrite of the Canada Business
Corporations Act, 2 which governs Federal companies, and was also followed by
various provinces in their business corporations acts. In the provincial business
corporations and Canada Business Corporations Acts, the preexisting common-law
duties of care of directors to corporations were codified by statutes. So what is now
section 122 of the Canada Business Corporations Act says that directors have two
duties. 3 First is a duty to "act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best
interests of the corporation"-what is called the statutory fiduciary duty. Second is
the duty to "exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person
would exercise in comparable circumstances"-what is called the duty of care. 4
These codified duties of directors were supplemented by something that we have
in Canada that I have not heard of in any of the other jurisdictions represented,
and that is our oppression remedy. Under the CBCA (the Canada Business Corporations Act) and similar statutes in the provinces, a complainant can apply to the
court for an order if the powers of the directors of the corporation have been
exercised in a manner that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to or that unfairly
disregards the interests of any security holder, creditors, director or officers, and
the Court may make an order to reconcile the matters complained of."5
The Court has extremely broad powers. It can issue an injunction, it can appoint
a receiver to take over the business, it can order the liquidation of the company, or
it can issue orders for compensation. A complainant is broadly defined as a security
holder or a former security holder, a director and officer or a former director and
officer, certain government administrators, or "any other person who, in the discretion of the court, is a proper person to make an application." 6 The case law has

52. Canada
53. Id. at §
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Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, ch. C-44 § 122(1).
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said that such complainant can be a creditor. 7 So a creditor has direct action in
Canada against a director. It raises the question, if the director has acted in a manner that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to or unfairly disregards the interests of
that creditor, then it can get extraordinary relief, if it is able to establish that.
So, in addition to the statutory duties of directors to the corporation, the statutory fiduciary duty to the corporation and the duty of care in carrying out the
duties, there is a whole panoply of creditor remedies in Canada, just as in the U.S.,
for the fraudulent transfers and the other types of creditor legislation, creditor
remedies. There is also this oppression remedy in our corporate statutes.
The Supreme Court of Canada noted in the People's Department Store case, the
particular Canadian corporate-law landscape, and it said:
The Canadianlegal landscape with respect to stakeholders is unique. Creditors
are only one set of stakeholders, but their interests are protected in a number of
ways. Some are specific, as in the case of amalgamation . . . Others cover a
broad range of situations. The oppression remedy ... and the similar provisions of provincial legislation regarding corporationsgrant the broadest rights
to creditors of any common law jurisdiction ... The fact that creditors' interests increase in relevancy as a corporation'sfinances deteriorate is apt to be
relevant to . . . the exercise of discretion by a court in grantingstanding to a
party as a 'complainant' under ... the CBCA as a 'properperson'..."
This applies in bringing either a derivative action in the name of the corporationthe same remedies as are available in the United States-or to bring an oppression
remedy, which I just described to you.
After setting out the Canadian legal framework, which is unique in providing the
most available remedies to creditors who are faced with insolvency of the corporation, the court then considered the two specific duties set out in the Business Corporations Act. The first is the fiduciary duty to act honestly and in good faith, in
the best interest of the corporation. The court held that it was also described as a
duty of loyalty, incorporating American terminology.
The Supreme Court of Canada described such duty of loyalty or the statutory
fiduciary duty as one to maximize the value of the corporation:
Insofar as the statutory fiduciary duty is concerned, it is clear that the phrase,
'the best interests of the corporation,' should be read not simply as 'the best
interests of the shareholders.' From an economic perspective, the 'best interests
of the corporation' means the maximization of the value of the corporation.59
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We've heard different views on maximization of value of the corporation and the
directors' responsibility to do that over the course of the day.
The court was specific. It said that the interests of the corporation to which the
directors owe their duties are not to be confused with the interests of the creditors
or those of any other stakeholder, although those interests, creditors, employees,
the environment, shareholders, government-all of those interests fall within the
consideration of the directors in seeking to maximize the value of the corporation.' The court elaborated on what that meant and also suggested that the director duties could be described as seeking a better corporation-maximizing the
value and seeking a better corporation was how to describe the exercise of their
duties."
So unlike the Delaware Court, the Supreme Court of Canada stated specifically
that the statutory fiduciary duty is not extended to creditors, although creditors are
within the scope of interests, but that the directors must consider how to maximize
the value of the corporation.62 Like the Delaware court and using very similar language, the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the concept of any shifting duties
when a corporation is in the vicinity of insolvency.63 It recognized that throughout
the corporation's existence, there will be various shifts in interests that naturally
occur as a corporation's fortunes rise and fall, but that does not alter in any way the
fiduciary duty of the directors to the corporation.64
The court was quite strong on this, as Russell alluded to this morning. He said
they were all over the shifting duties in the vicinity of insolvency. This is what they
said:
The directors' fiduciary duty does not change when a corporation is in the
nebulous "vicinity of insolvency". That phrase hasnot been defined; moreover,
it is incapable of definition and has no legal meaning. What it is obviously
intended to convey is a deteriorationin the corporation'sfinancialstability. In
assessing the actions of directors it is evident that any honest and good faith
attempt to redress the corporation'sfinancial problems will, if successful, both
retain value for shareholders and improve the position of creditors. If unsuccessful, 5it will not qualify as a breach of duty set out in 122(1)(a) of the
6
CBCA.
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That is what the Supreme Court of Canada has said, which certainly does advise
the directors on what they have to consider when faced with an insolvency of the
business.
Vice Chancellor Strine held in Production Resources that the fiduciary duty of
directors should not be used to fill gaps that do not exist.66 That was the very
similar issue that was addressed by the Supreme Court of Canada. It found no gap
to fill as a result of the existing remedies that were available for stakeholders of an
insolvent business and for creditors in particular. It said: "In light of the availability
of both the oppression remedy and of an action based on the duty of care"--which
they discussed further-"stakeholders have viable remedies at their disposal. There
is no need to read the interests of creditors into the statutory fiduciary duty."67
Moreover, in the circumstances of this case, a breach wasn't committed in any
event. So, the court held that the statutory fiduciary duty of directors to act in the
best interests of the corporation was owed to the corporation, and not to creditors
in particular.
It then went on to talk about the business judgment rule and the defense of the
business judgment rule in terms that were very similar to what has been discussed
over the course of the day. The court then turned to duty of care and said that, yes,
the duty of care would be available to creditors.68 But reading their decision carefully, that is clearly intended to only be available as a derivative claim.
It is only in Quebec, which is a civil-law jurisdiction, where there is a specific
civil-law provision that says that an individual can sue on the breach of a statute,
that the Supreme Court of Canada has said that creditors can sue the directors on
the duty of care directly, but in the rest of the common-law provinces in Canada,69
we just do not have that same provision. It is clear that the Court was not going to
the extent of a direct remedy by saying that the duty of care that directors have also
extends to creditors. That does give rise to a derivative action if that duty is allegedly breached, but does not give the creditors a direct action against the directors.
So the reason Russell and I wrote this paper together was to flag the remarkable
similarities in how the court in Delaware and the Supreme Court of Canada looked
at these issues and how the Supreme Court of Canada came to a different conclusion on the fiduciary duties. One might say that is because of the different legal
framework in Canada, but you will have noted from the few quotes that I read that
the court was pretty clear-not much to debate. There is no such duty and certainly no shifting duties, on the eve of insolvency, or in the twilight zone of
insolvency.
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Along with the rest of my panel members, I am happy to answer any questions
you might have.
PARTICIPANT: I am curious. In France and Germany, is there judicial deference to
directors?
REID FELDMAN: Well, deference really is not the word. I mentioned the situation
which Hanno also mentioned, comblement de passif. The statute says that a manager can be held liable for a shortfall of assets caused by a management error. That
is a wide-open term. But in applying that standard, the courts have been hesitant to
second-guess managers-and they haven't really phrased it in terms of the business
judgment rule. Just as in the U.S., in France, judges usually do not venture into that
terrain. On the other hand, the way the statute is framed, it does not require them
to second-guess very much because, as I said, ipso facto, when things turn out
badly, somebody made a mistake. So they do not have to get into second-guessing
and they do not need to raise the question of whether business judgment is good or
bad.
ANDREAS ENGERT: It is the same in Germany. Negligence used to be the standard
in the statute. Actually, it was amended a few days ago to include some sort of a
business judgment rule. There's also a Supreme Court decision from 1998 which
made reference to the U.S. concept.
HANNO MERKT: Yes. It is interesting to see that in Germany this was for many
years an area in which we did not have either case law or statutory law. There was,
in fact, virtually no orientation for managers on the legal requirements of a business judgment. It started only in the mid-1990s that single cases were brought to
higher courts. As late as 1998, the Federal Supreme Court in a landmark decision
articulated a business judgment rule-type standard for the first time. The court did
not use the technical term nor did it make any reference to U.S. law, but it is clear
from all that we know that the federal judges did have in mind the U.S.-type business judgment rule. Later on, in 2005, the German Legislature introduced a statutory provision implementing the business judgment rule into the Stock Company
Act. Note that the German version of the business judgment rule differs from its
U.S. counterpart in one important respect: Under the German provision, the burden of proof is on the defendant-director. This is likely to limit the beneficial effect
of the rule seriously. But we will see how we are going to cope with that, and
perhaps in a couple of years one can tell more about the effectiveness of that German-type business judgment rule.
RICHARD BOOTH: I will leave you with one parting thought. It seems that directors and creditors are analogous to each other. That gives you something to think
about.
REID FELDMAN: Thank you, Richard, for organizing this.
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